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Top: Jewish Occupied Governments: United States: Zionists and Jewish Communists in the Democratic Party: Iron Curtain Chapter VIII

This article appeared freely on the Internet on December 26, 2005 at http://web.archive.org/web/19990218080334/www.usaor.net/users/ipm/curtain8.html and is archived here only for scholarship, research, education, and personal use by those previously requesting it in accordance with the "fair use" provision in Title 17 Section 107 of the copyright law.


Cleaning the Augean Stables

In ancient fable one of the giant labors of Hercules was cleaning the labyrinthine stables of King Augeas who possessed "an immense wealth of herds" (Encyc. Brit.,II, 677) and twelve sacred bulls. The removal of accumulated filth was accomplished in the specified time and the story of difficulty successfully overcome has been told through the ages for entertainment and for inspiration.

The modern significance of the parable of Hercules may be thus interpreted. King Augeas is Mr. Truman. The sacred bulls are those high and mighty individuals who control and deliver the votes of minority blocs. The filth is the nineteen-year accumulation of Communists and fellow-travelers in the various departments, executive agencies, bureaus, and what not, of our government. To clean out the filth, there can be but one Hercules -- an aroused American people.

Exactly how can the American people proceed under our laws to clean out subversives and other scoundrels from our government? There are three principal ways: (a) by a national election; (b) by the constitutional right of expressing their opinion; and (c) by influencing the Congress to exercise certain powers vested in the Congress by the Constitution, including the power of impeachment.

A national election is the normal means employed by the people to express their will for a change of policy. There are reasons, however, why such a means should not be exclusively relied on. For one thing, a man elected by the people may lose completely the confidence of the people and do irreparable damage by bad appointive personnel and bad policies after one election and before another. In the second place, our two leading parties consist of so many antagonistic groups wearing a common label that candidates for president and vice-president represent compromises and it is hard to get a clear-cut choice as between Democrats and Republicans. For instance, in the campaigns of 1940, 1944, and 1948 the Republicans offered the American voters Wendell Willkie, and Thomas Dewey -- twice! Willkkie was a sincere but poorly informed and obviously inexperienced "one worlder," apparently with a soft spot toward Communism, or at least a blind spot, as evidenced in his hiring or lending himself as a lawyer to prevent government action against alleged Communists. Thus, among "the twelve Communist Party leaders" arrested July 26, 1951), was William Schneiderman, "State Chairman of the Communist Party of California and a member of the Alternate National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States." The preceding quotations are from the New York Times (July 27, 1951), and the article continues: "With the late Wendell L. Willkie as his counsel, Schneiderman defeated in the Supreme Court in 1943 a government attempt to revoke his citizinship for his political associations. Schneiderman was born in Russia," Likewise, Governor Dewey of New York, campaigning on a "don't bother the Communists" program, won the Oregon Republican presidential primary election in 1948 in a close contest from Harold Stassen, who endorsed anti-Communist legislation. Governor Dewey, largely avoiding issues, except in this instance, moved on to nomination and to defeat, The moral seems to be that the American people see no reason to change from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party with a candidate favorable to or indifferent to Communism. With such a Republican candidate, a Democratic candidate may be favored by some conservatives who rely on the more or less conservative Democrats -- who extend from Maryland in an arc through the South around to Nevada -- to block the extreme radicalism of a Democratic administration. Governor Dewey followed the Roosevelt path not only in a disinclination to combat Communism; in such matters as the "purge" of Senator Revercomb of West Virginia, he showed evidence of a dictatorial intention to which not even Roosevelt would have presumed.

Thus, however much one may hope for a pair of strong, patriotic, and able Democratic candidates or a pair of strong, patriotic, and able Republican candidates at the next election, there is no certainty of a realized hope. There is likewise no certainty of success in the move of a number of patriotic people in both parties to effect a merger of American-minded Republicans and non-leftist Democrats in time for a slate of coalition candidates in the next presidential election. This statement is not meant to disparage the movement, whose principal sponsor Senator Karl Mundt represents a state (South Dakota) not in the Union during the Civil War and is therefore an ideal leader of a united party of patriotic Americans both Northern and Southern.

Senator Mundt's proposal deserves active and determined support, because it is logical for people who feel the same way to vote together. Moreover, the defective implementation of the Mundt proposal would certainly be acclaimed by the great body of the people -- those who acclaimed General MacArthur on his return from Tokyo. The stumbling-block, of course, is that it is very hard for the great body of the people to make itself politically effective either in policy or in the selection of delegates to the national nominating conventions, since leaders already in office will, with few exceptions, be reluctant to change the setup (whatever its evil ) under which they became leaders.

To sum up, a coalition team -- as Senator Mundt proposes -- would be admirable. Nevertheless, other methods of effecting a change of our national policy must be explored.


A possible way for the American public to gain its patriotic ends is by the constitution-protected right of petition (First Amendment). The petition, whether in the form of a document with many signatures or a mere individual letter, is far more effective than the average individual is likely to believe. In all cases the letters received are beyond question tabulated as straws in the wind of public opinion; and to a busy Congressman or Senator a carefully prepared and well documented letter from a person he can trust may well be a guide to policy. The author thus summed up the influence of letters in his book Image of Life (Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York, 1940, pp. 207-208: It is perhaps unfortunate, but undeniably true that letter-writers wield a powerful influence in America. Along with the constant newspaper and magazine "polls" of citizens and voters, letters are the modern politician's method of keeping his ear to the ground. This fact was startlingly illustrated in 1939 by a high executive's issuing a statement justifying a certain governmental stand by an analysis of the correspondence received on the subject. Since the letter wields this influence, and since it is one of the chief weapons of the organized minority, public-spirited citizens should use it, too. They should write to members of state legislatures, United States Congressmen and Senators, and other government officials endorsing or urging measures which the writers believe necessary for the good of the country. Similar letters of support should of course be written to any others in or out of government service, who are under the fire of minorities for courageous work in behalf of decency, morality, and patriotism.

The use of the letter for political purposes by organized groups is illustrated by the fact that a certain congressman (his words to the author in Washington) received in one day more than 5,000 letters and other forms of communication urging him to vote for a pending measure favorable to "Israel," and not one post card on the other side!

Letters in great volume cannot be other than effective. To any Congressman, even though he disapproves of the policy or measure endorsed by the letters, they raise the question of his being possibly in error in view of such overwhelming opposition to his viewpoint. To a Congressman who believes sincerely -- as some do -- that he is an agent whose duty is not to act on his own judgment, but to carry out the people's will, a barrage of letters is a mandate on how to vote. Apparently for the first time, those favoring Western Christian civilization adopted the technique of the opposition and expressed themselves in letters to Washington on the dismissal of General MacArthur.

In addition to writing letters to the President and his staff and to one's own senators and congressmen, the patriotic American should write letters to other senators and congressmen who are members of committees concerned with a specific issue (see c, below ). In this way, he will meet and possibly frustrate the new tactics of the anti-American element which, from its news-paper advertisements, seems to be shifting its controlled letters from a writer's "own congressman and senators" to "committee chairmen and committee members. "For the greater effectiveness which comes from a knowledge of the structure of the government, it is exceedingly important that each patriotic citizen possess or have access to a copy of the latest Congressional Directory (Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., $1.50).

The patriotic citizen should not let his or her letter writing stop with letters to officials in Washington. Letters along constructive lines should be sent to other influential persons such as teachers, columnists, broadcasters, and judges letting them know the writer's views. Persons such as Judge Medina, who presided in a fair and impartial manner over a trial involving charges of communism, are inundated by letters and telegrams of calumny and vilification (his words to the author and others at a meeting of the Columbia Alumni in Dallas). To such officials, a few letters on the other side are heartening.

Letters to newspapers are especially valuable. Whether published or not, they serve as opinion-indicators to a publisher. Those that are published are sometimes clipped and mailed to the White House and to members of the Congress by persons who feel unable to compose letters of their own. The brevity of these letters and their voice-of-the-people flavor cause them also to be read by and thus to influence many who will not cope with the more elaborate expressions of opinion by columnist and editorial writers.


As the ninth printing of The Iron Curtain Over America was being prepared (summer of 1952) for the press, it became a fact of history that President Truman would not succeed himself for the presidential term, 1953-1957. The following pages of this chapter should therefore be read not as a specific recommendation directed against Mr. Truman but as a general consideration of the question of influencing executive action through pressure upon Congressional committees and -- in extreme cases -- by impeachment, with the acts and policies of Mr. Truman and his chief officials used as illustrative material.

If the pressure of public opinion by a letter barrage or otherwise is of no avail, because of already existing deep commitments as a pay-off for blocs of votes or for other reasons, there are other procedures.

The best of these, as indicated under (b) above, is to work through the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Unfortunately the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate has a majority of members willing to play along with almost any vote-getting scheme. It was only by the skillful maneuvering of the Chairman, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, that the Committee was prevented from passing during World War II a pro-Zionist resolution on the Middle East which might have prejudiced the American victory in the war. Despite Mr. Acheson's record, every Republican on the Committee approved the nomination of that "career man" to be Secretary of State (telegram of Senator Tom Connally to the author. See also the article by C.P.Trussell, New York Times, January 19, 1949). Thus with no Republican opposition to attract possible votes from the Democratic majority, the committee vote on Acheson's confirmation was unanimous! Parenthetically, a lesson is obvious -- namely, that both political parties should in the future be much more careful than in the past in according committee membership to a Senator, or to a Representative, of doubtful suitability for sharing the committee's responsibilities.

Despite one very unfortunate selection, the Republican membership of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs averages up better than the Republican membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The House Committee is not so influential, however, because of the Constitution's express vesting of foreign policy in the Senate.

In contrast, however, the House Appropriations Committee is under the Constitution more influential than the Appropriations Committee in the Senate, and might under public pressure withhold funds (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Paragraph 6) from a government venture, office, or individual believed inimical to the welfare of the United States (see George Sokolshy's syndicated column, Dallas Morning News and other papers, Jan. 23, 1951. In the matter of appropriations, the Senate Committee on Appropriations has, however, made a great record in safeguarding what it believes to be the public interest. For example, in 1946 the senior Republican member of this vital Senate Committee was instrumental in achieving the Congressional elimination from the State Department budget of $4,000,000 ear marked for the Alfred McCormack unit -- an accomplishment which forced the exit of that undesired "Special Assistant to the Secretary of State." There is no reason why this thoroughly Constitutional procedure should not be imitated in the 1950's. The issue was raised for discussion by Congressman John Phillips of California, a member of the House Appropriations Committee, in May, 1951 (AP dispatch in the Times-Herald, Dallas, May 14, 1951).

In mid-1950 the House Committee on Un-American Activities seemed to need prodding by letters from persons in favor of the survival of America. The situation was described thus in a Washington Times-Herald (November 26, 1950) editorial entitled "Wake the Watchman": The reason the committee has gone to sleep is that it is now, also for the first time in its history, subservient to the executive departments which have so long hid the Communists and fought the committee.

For evidence, compare the volume entitled Hearings Regarding Communism in the United States Government -- Part 2, that record committee proceedings of Aug. 28 and 31, and Sept. 1 and 15, 1950, with the records of comparable inquiries any year from the committee's origin in 1938 down to 1940 when the present membership took over.

The witnesses who appeared before the committee in these latest hearings need no explaining. They were: Lee Pressman, Abraham George Silverman, Nathan Witt, Charles Kramer, John J. Abt and Max Lowenthal. This handsome galaxy represents the very distilled essence of inside knowledge in matters that can help the people of this Republic understand why we are now wondering where Stalin is going to hit us next. At least one, Max Lowenthal, is an intimate friend of President Trumen, regularly in and out of side entrances at the White House. Perhaps that accounts -- of course it does -- for the arrogant assurance with which Lowenthal spot in the committees eye when he was finally brought before it for a few feeble questions.

Incidentally, "Truman was chosen as candidate for Vice President by Sidney Hillman, at the suggestion (according to Jonathan Daniels in his recent book A man of Independence ) of Max Lowenthal" . . . ("The Last Phase," by Edna Lonigan, Humen Events, May 2, 1951).

In fairness to the present membership, however, it is well to add that, from a variety of circumstances, the Committee has suffered from a remarkable and continuing turn-over of membership since the convening of the 81st Congress in January, 1949. New regulations -- passed for the purpose by the Democratic 81st Congress, which was elected along with President Truman in 1948 -- drove from the Committee two of its most experienced and aggressive members: Mr. Rankin of Mississippi, because he was Chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and Mr. Hebert of Louisiana, because he was not a lawyer. In January, 1949, the experienced Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota left the House and his membership on the Committee to take his seat in the Senate. Promotion to the Senate (Dec. 1, 1950) likewise cost the Committee the services of Congressman Richard Nixon of California, the member most active in the preliminaries to the trial of Alger Hiss. In the election of 1950, Representative Francis Case of South Dekota was advanced to the Senate. After a single term on the Committee, Congressman Burr P. Harrison of Virginia became a member of the Ways and Means Committee on Un-American Activities. Thus whin the Committee was reconstituted at the opening of the 82nd Congress in January, 1951, only one man, Chairman John S.Wood of Georgia, had had ,more than one full two-year term of service and a majority of the nine members were new.

The Committee, like all others, needs letters of encouragement to offset pressure from pro-Communist elements, but there were evidences in 1951 of its revitalization. On April 1, 1951, it issued a report entitled "The Communist Peace Offensive," which it described as "the most dangerous hoax ever devised by the international Communist conspiracy" (see Red-educators in the Communist Peace Offensive, National Council for American Education, 1 Maiden Lane, New York38, N.Y.) Moreover, in 1951 the committee was again probing the important question of Communism in the motion picture industries at Hollywood, California. Finally, late in 1951 the Un-American Activities Committee issued a "brand new" publication, a "Guide Book to Subversive Organizations," highly recommended by The Americanism Division, The American Legion (copies may be had from the National Americanism Division, The American Legion, 700 N. Pennsylvania St., Indianapolis, Ind.; 25 cents; in lots of 25 or more, 15 cents. See, also, pp. 101-103, above).

Fortunately, the Senate Judiciary Committee is also accomplishing valuable work in the exposure of the nature and methods of the Communist infiltration. Its work is referred to, its chairman Senator McCarran of Nevada is quoted, and its documents are represented by excerpts here and there in this book.

The Rules Committee of the House was restored to its traditional power by the 82nd Congress in 1951 and may also prove an effective brake on bills for implementing the dangerous policies of an incompetent, poorly advised, or treasonable leadership in the executive departments.

As a last resort, however, a President of the United States or any other member of the Executive or Judicial Branches of the government can be removed by impeachment. Article I, Section 2, paragraph 5; Article I, Section 3, paragraph 6; Article II, Section 4, paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution name the circumstances under which, and provide explicitly the means by which, a majority of the representatives and two-thirds of the senators can remove a president who is guilty of"misdemeanors" or shows "inability" to perform the high functions of his office. Surely some such construction might have been placed upon Mr. Truman's gross verbal attack (1950) upon the United States Marine Corps, whose members were at the time dying in Korea, or upon his repeated refusal to cooperate with Canada, with Congress, or with the Courts in facing up to the menace of the 43,217 known Communists said by J. Edgar Hoover (AP dispatch, Dallas Times-Herald, February 8, 1950).

The matter of President Truman's unwillingness to move against Communism came to a head with the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Under the title, "Necessity for Legislation," the two Houses of Congress found as follows:

(1) There exists a world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization. . .

(12) The Communist network in the United States is inspired and controlled in large part by foreign agents who are sent into the United States ostensibly as attaches of foreign legations, affiliates of international organizations, members of trading commissions, and in similar capacities, but who use their diplomatic or semi-diplomatic status as a shield behind which to engage in activities prejudicial to the public security.

(13) There are, under our present immigration laws, numerous aliens who have been found to be deportable, many of whom are in the subversive, criminal, or immoral classes who are free to roam the country at will without supervision or control. . .

(15) The Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent successes of communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States and to the existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States.

A measure for curbing Communism in the United States -- prepared in the light of the above preamble -- was approved by both Senate and House. It was then sent to the President. What did he do?

He vetoed it.

Thereupon both Senate and House (September 22, 1950) overrode the President's veto by far more than the necessary two-thirds majorities, and the internal Security Act became "Public Law 831 -- 81st Congress -- Second Session." The enforcement of the law, of course, became the responsibility of its implacable enemy, the head of the Executive Branch of our government! But the President's efforts to block the anti-Communists did not end with that historic veto. "President Truman Thursday rejected a Senate committee's request for complete files on the State Department's loyalty-security cases on the ground that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest" (AP dispatch, Washington, April 3, 1952). To what "public" did Mr. Truman refer? The situation was summed up well by General MacArthur in a speech before a joint session of the Mississippi legislature (March 22, 1952). The general stated that our policy is "leading us toward a communist state with as dreadful certainty as though the leaders of the Kremlin themselves were charting our course."

In view of his veto of the Internal Security Act and his concealment of security data on government employees from Congressional committees, it is hard to exonerate Mr. Truman from the suspicion of having more concern for leftist votes than for the safety or survival of the United States. Such facts naturally suggest an inquiry into the feasibility of initiating the process of impeachment.

Another possible ground for impeachment might be the President's apparent violation of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 11, which vests in Congress the power "To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." This authority of the Congress has never been effectively questioned. Thus in his "Political Observations" (1795) James Madison wrote "The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the Legislature the power of declaring a state of war" (quoted from "Clipping of Note," No. 38, The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., Irvington-on-Hudaon, New York). Subsequent interpreters of our basic State Paper, except perhaps some of those following in the footsteps of Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (Chapter III, above), have concurred.

It was seemingly in an effort to avoid the charge of violating this provision of the Constitution that President Truman, except for a reported occasional slip of the tongue, chose to refer to his commitment of our troops in Korea as a "police action" and not a war. Referring to the possibility of President Truman's sending four additional divisions to Europe where there was no war, Senator Byrd of Virginia said: "But if by chance he does ignore Congress, Congress has ample room to exercise its authority by the appropriations method and it would be almost grounds for impeachment" (UP dispatch in Washington Times-Herald, March 15, 1951). The distinguished editor and commentator David Lawrence (U.S. News and World Report, April 20, 1951) also brought up the question of impeachment: If we are to grow technical, Congress, too, has some constitutional rights. It can impeach President Truman not only for carrying on a war in Korea without a declaration of war by Congress, but primarily for failing to let our troops fight the enemy with all the weapons at their command.

The question of President Truman's violation of the Constitution in the matter of committing our troops in Korea has been raised with overwhelming logic by Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota. Article 43 of the United Nations charter, as the Senator points out, provides that members nations of the UN shall supply armed forces "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." Thus the starting of the Truman-Acheson war in Korea not only violated the United States Constitution, but completely lacked United Nations authority -- until such authority was voted retroactively! (Washington Times-Herald, May 17, 1951; also see Chapter VI, d, above.)

The House in the 81st Congress several times overrode a Truman veto by more than the Constitutional two-thirds vote. Even in that 81st Congress, more than five-sixths of the Senators voted to override the President's veto of the McCarran-Mundt-Nixon anti-Communist bill, which became Public Law 831. With the retirement of Mrs. Helen Douglas and other noted administration supporters, and Mr. Vito Marcantonio, the 82nd Congress is probably even less inclined than the predecessor Congress to tolerate the Truman attitude toward the control of subversives and might not hesitate in a moment of grave national peril to certify to the Senate for possible impeachment for a violation of the Constitution the name of a man so dependent on leftist votes or so sympathetic with alien thought that he sees no menace -- merely a "red herring" -- in Communism.

With reference again to impeachment, an examination of the career of other high executives including the Secretary of State might possibly find one or more of them who might require investigation on the suspicion of unconstitutional misdemeanors.

Despite the bitter fruit of Yalta, Mr. Acheson never issued a recantation. He never repudiated his affirmation of lasting fidelity to his beloved friend, Alger Hiss, who was at Yalta as the newly appointed State Department "Director of Special Political Affairs." Despite the Chinese attack on our troops in Korea, Mr. Acheson never, to the author's knowing, admitted the error, if not the treason, of the policy of his department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs down to and including the very year of 1950, when these Chinese Communists, the darlings of the dominant Leftists of our State Department, attacked us in the moment of our victory over the Communists of North Korea. "What then will you do with the fact that as concerning Soviet Russia, from Yalta to this day, every blunder in American foreign policy has turned out to be what the Kremlin might have wished this country to do?? All you can say is that if there had been a sinister design it would look like this" (The Freeman, June 18, 1951.

General Marshall was at Yalta as Chief of Staff of U.S. Army. According to press reports, he never remembered what he was doing the night before Pearl Harbor. At Yalta, it was not memory but judgment that failed him for he was the Superior Officer who tacitly, if not heartily, approved the military deals along the Elbe and the Yalu -- deals which are still threatening to ruin our country. General Ambassador Marshall not only failed miserably in China; Secretary of State Marshall took no effective steps whin a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, according to Senator Ferguson of Michigan, handed him a memorandum stating in part; "It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson. It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity" (INS, Washington Times-Herald, July 24, 1950). The reference to Acheson was to Undersecretary Acheson, as he then was. Unfortunately in late 1951, when General Marshall ceased to be secretary of Defense, he was replaced by an other man, Robert A. Lovett, who, whatever his personal views, carried nevertheless the stigma of having been Undersecretary of State from July, 1947, to January, 1949 (Congressional Directory, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 365), when our opposition in China was being ruined under the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall.

The pro-Soviet accomplishments of the high-placed leftists and their dupes in our government are brilliantly summed up by Edna Lonigan in Human Events (Sept. 8, 1948): Our victorious armies halted where Stalin wished. His followers managed Dumbarton Oaks, UN, UNRRA, our Polish and Spanish policies. They gave Manchuria and Northern Korea to Communism. They dismantled German industry, ran the Nuremberg trials and even sought to dictate our economic policy in Japan. Their greatest victory was the "Morgenthau Plan."

And the astounding thing is that except for the dead (Roosevelt, Hillman, Hopkins, Winant) and Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Hiss, and General Marshall, most of those chiefly responsible for our policy as described above were still in power in June, 1952!

In Solemn truth, do not seven persons share most of the responsibility for establishing the Communist grip on the world? Are not the seven: (1) Marx, the founder of violent Communism; (2) Engels, the promoter of Marx; (3, 4, 5)Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin; (6) Franklin D. Roosevelt, who rescued the tottering Communist empire by recognition (1933), by the resultant financial support, by his refusal to proceed against Communists in the United States, and by the provisions of the Yalta Conference; and (7) Harry S. Truman, who agreed at Potsdam to the destruction of Germany and thereafter followed the Franklin Roosevelt policy of refusing to act against Communists in the United States -- the one strong nation which remains as a possible obstacle to Communist world power?

In spite of the consolidation of Stalin's position in Russia by Franklin Roosevelt and by Stalin's "liquidation" of millions of anti-Communists in Russia after Roosevelt's recognition, the Soviet Union in 1937 was stymied in its announced program of world conquest by two road-blocks: Japan in the East and Germany in the West. These countries, the former the size of California and the latter the size of Texas, were small for great powers, and since their main fears were of the enormous, hostile, and nearby Soviet Union, they did not constitute an actual danger to the United States. The men around Roosevelt, many of them later around Truman, not merely defeated but destroyed the two road-blocks against the spread of Stalinist Communism! Again we come to the question: Should the United States continue to use the men whose stupidity or treason built the Soviet Union into the one great land power of the world?

In continuing to employ people who were in office during the tragic decisions of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, are we not exactly as sensible as a hypothetical couple who employ the same baby sitter who has already killed three of their children?

"By What Faith, Then, Can We Find Hope in Those Whose Past Judgments So Grievously Erred? asked Senator Ecton of Montana on September &, 1951. "Can We Trust the Future to Those Who Betrayed the Past?" asked Senator Jenner of Indiana in a speech in the Senate of the United States on September 19, 1950. Whatever the cause of our State Department's performances, so tragic for America, in 1945 and thereafter (see also Chapter VI, above), the answer to Senator Jenner's point blank question is an incontrovertible "No."

Congressmen, the patriotic elements in the press, and the letter-writing public should continually warn the President, however, that a mere shuffling around of the save old cast of Yalta actors and others "Whose past judgments so grievously erred" will not be sufficient. We must not again have tolerators of extreme leftism, such as Mr. John J. McCloy, who was Assistant Secretary of War from April, 1941, to November, 1945, and Major General Clayton Bissell, who was A.C. of S.G.-2, i.e., the Army's Chief of Intelligence, from Feb. 5, 1944, "to the end of the war" (Who's Who in America, 1950-1951, pp. 1798 and 232). In February, 1945, these high officials were questioned by a five-man committee created by the new 79th Congress to investigate charges of communism in the War Department.

In the New york Times of February 28 (article by Lewis Wood), Mr. McCloy is quoted as follows: The facts point to the difficulties of legal theory which are involved in taking the position that mere membership in the Communist party, present or past should exclude a person from the army or a commission. But beyond any questions of legal theory, a study of the question and our experience convinced me that we were not on sound ground in our investigation when we placed emphasis solely on Communist affiliation.

According to some newspapers, Mr. McCloy's testimony gave the impression that he did not care if 49% of a man's loyalty was elsewhere provided he was 51% American. The validity of Christ's "No man can serve two masters" was widely recalled to mind. Edward N. Scheiberling, National Commander of the American Legion, referring to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy's testimony, stated (New York Times,) March 2, 1945): That the Assistant Secretary had testified that the new policy of the armed forces would admit to officer rank persons 49 percent loyal to an alien power, and only 51 percent loyal to the United States.

The Legion head asserted further:

Fifty-one percent loyalty is not enough when the security of our country is at stake. . . The lives of our sons, the vital military secrets of our armed forces must not be entrusted to men of divided loyalty.

The Washington Times-Herald took up the cudgels against Mr. McCloy and he was shifted to the World Bank and thence to the post of High Commissioner of Germany (Chapter VI, above). With sufficient documentation to appear convincing, The Freeman as late as August 27, 1951, stated that "Mr. McCloy seems to be getting and accepting a kind of advice that borders on mental disorder."

General Bissell was moved from A.C. of S., G-2 to U.S. Military Attache at London. He received, a little later, a bon voyage present of a laudatory feature article in the Communist Daily Worker. Below the accompanying portrait (Daily Worker, June 20, 1947) was the legend "Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, wartime head of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps, who defended Communist soldiers from the attacks of Washington seat-warmers during the war."

What of the Congressional Committee? Though it had been created and ordered to work by a coalition of patriotic Republicans and Southern Democratic majority in the house chose members to its "left-of -center" liking, and the committee (Chairman: Mr. Thomason of Texas!) by a strict party vote of 3-2 expressed itself as satisfied with the testimony of McCloy and Bissell.

Surely the American public wants no high officials tolerant of Communists or thanked by Communists for favors rendered.

Surely Americans will not longer be fooled by another shuffling of the soiled New Deal deck with its red aces, deuces, knaves, and jokers. This time we will not be blinded by a spurious "bipartisan" appointment of Achesonites whose nominal membership in the Republican Party does not conceal an ardent "me-too-ism." Americans surely will not, for instance, tolerate actors like tweedle-dee Acheson right down the line even to such an act as inviting Hiss to New York to become President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of which Dulles was the new Chairman of the Board. It might have been expected that with Hiss away, his trouble in Washington would blow over -- but it did not.

The reference to high-placed War Department officials whose loyalty or judgment has been questioned by some of their fellow Americans brings us to an evaluation of the reception given in all parts of this nation to General MacArthur after his dismissal by President Truman in April, 1951. It seems that General MacArthur's ovation was due not to his five stars, for half a dozen generals and admirals have similar rank, but to his being a man of unquestioned integrity, unquestioned patriotism, and -- above all -- to his being avowedly a Christian.

Long before the spring crisis of 1951 General MacArthur was again and again featured in the obscure religious papers of many Christian denominations as a man who asked for more Christian missionaries for Japan and for New Testaments to give his soldiers. MacArthur's devout Christianity was jeered in some quarters but it made a lasting impression on that silent majority of Americans who have been deeply wounded by the venality and treason of men in high places.

"I was privileged in Tokyo," wrote John Gunther in The Riddle of MacArthur, "to read through the whole file of MacArthur's communications and pronouncements since the occupation began, and many of these touch, at least indirectly, on religious themes. He Constantly associates Christianity with both democracy and patriotism."

MacArthur is a Protestant, but to the editor of the Brooklyn Tablet, a Catholic periodical, he wrote as follows:

Through daily contact with our American men and women who are here engaged in the reshaping of Japan's future, there are penetrating into the Japanese mind the noble influences which find their origin and their inspiration in the American home. These influences are rapidly bearing fruit, and apart from the great numbers who are coming formally to embrace the Christian faith, a whole population is coming to understand, practice and cherish its underlying principals and ideals.

To some people this language of General MacArthur's may seem outmoded or antiquarian. The writings of the more publicized American theologians -- darlings of leftist book-reviews -- may indicate that the clear water of classical Christianity is drying up in a desert of experimental sociology, psychiatry, and institutionalized ethical culture. But such is not the case. The heart of America is still Christian in its felt need of redemption and salvation as well as in its fervent belief in the Resurrection.

Christianity in the historical, or classical, sense is closely allied with the founding and growth of America. Et was the common adherence to some form of Christianity which made it "possible to develop some degree of national unity out of the heterogeneous nationalities represented among the colonists" of early America (The Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the United States, p. 231). This acceptance of the tenets of Christianity as the bases of our American society gave our people a body of the basis of our American society gave our people a body of shared ideals -- a universally accepted code of conduct. Firmly rooted in Christianity was our conception of honor, both personal and national. It was not until a dominant number of powerful preachers and church executives got tired of the church's foundation-stone, charity, and abandoned it to welfare agencies -- it was not until these same leaders transferred their loyalty from the risen Christ to a new sort of leftist cult stemming from national councils and conferences -- that public morality declined to its present state in America. But the people in the leftist-infiltrated churches have by no means strayed as far as their leaders from the mainstream of Christianity. The really Christian people in all denominations wish to see restored in America the set of values, the pattern of conduct, the code of honor, which constitute and unify Western civilization and which once made ours a great and united country. It was precisely to this starved sense of spiritual unity, this desire to recover a lost spiritual heritage, that MacArthur the Christian made an unconscious appeal which burst forth into an enthusiasm never before seen in our country.

And so, when the Augean stables of our government are cleaned out, we must, in the words of George Washington, "put only Americans on guard." We must have as secretaries of State and Defense men who will go down through their list of assistant secretaries, counsellors. division chiefs, and so on, and remove all persons under any suspicion of Communism whether by ideological expression, association, or what not. While danger stalks the world, we should entrust the destiny of our beloved country to those and only those who can say with no reservation:

"This Is My Own, My Native Land!"

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